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I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2009, the United States Air Force (USAF) graduated its 
first pilot training class that did not receive flight training.1  These pilots are 
not headed for the cockpit but to the controls of an unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS).  In 2009, the USAF trained more UAS pilots than fighter or 
bomber pilots2 in an attempt to meet what the former commander of United 
States Central Command labeled an “insatiable need” for UAS.3  While the 
UAS “surge” began under President Bush, President Obama is expanding 
both UAS acquisition and their use.4  The proposed 2011 defense budget 
would double UAS production and for the first time the USAF will order 
more UAS than manned aircraft.5 
While UAS are now ubiquitous on the modern day battlefield,6 the 
disagreement and controversy surrounding them continues to grow.  One 
commentator referred to UAS as “armed robotic killers,”7 while a senior 
analyst at Human Rights Watch described them as the weapon system most 
 
1. Gordon Lubold, US Air Force’s Class of 2009:  Pilots Who Won’t Fly , THE CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 28, 2009, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/military/2009/ 
0928/p02s04-usmi.html. 
2. Fred Kaplan, Attack of the Drones, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://www. 
newsweek.com/id/215825/page/1. 
3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES IMPROVED STRA-
TEGIC AND ACQUISITION PLANNING CAN HELP ADDRESS EMERGING CHALLENGES 2, available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05395t.pdf (testimony of Sharon Pickup and Michael Sullivan) 
[hereinafter GAO report].  Central Command is the command responsible for the wars in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  General David Petraeus, the current commander of Central Command, said 
in January 2010 that “[w]e can’t get enough drones.”  P.W. Singer, Defending Against Drones 
How Our New Favorite Weapon In The Way On Terror Could Soon Be Turned Against Us, 
NEWSWEEK, March 8, 2010, available at http://www newsweek.com/id/234114. 
4. Jane Mayer, The Predator War:  What Are The Risks Of The CIA’s Covert Drone 
Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 28, 2009, at 37, available at http://www newyorker.com/ 
reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer (reporting that in President Obama’s first nine and 
half months in office he authorized as many UAS strikes as President Bush did in his last three 
years in office). 
5. Julian Barnes, Pentagon Increases Drone Fleet in New Budget, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 2, 
2010, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2010954876spenddig 
02 html. 
6. The United States Army reported a 400 percent increase in the amount of UAS flight 
hours from 1999 to 2009. J.D. Leipold, Army to Increase Medevac Support, Add New CAB, More 
UAVs, ARMY NEWS SERV., Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.army mil/news/2010/01/07/ 
32603-army-to-increase-medevac-support-add-new-cab-more-uavs/.  In 1999, three UAVs flew 
500 hours, compared with 1,700 UAVs flying more than 180,000 hours in 2009. Id. 
7. John Pike, Coming to the Battlefield:  Stone-Cold Robot Killers, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 
2009, at B3.  Pike, the director of the military information website GlobalSecurity.org claims that 
“[w]ithin a decade, the Army will field armed robots with intellects that possess, as H.G. Wells 
put it, ‘minds that are to our minds as ours are to those of those of the beasts that perish, intellects 
vast and cool and unsympathetic.’” Id. 
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capable of destruction he has ever seen.8  Much of the recent controversy 
and associated disagreement involves armed UAS launching missile attacks 
at al Qaeda and Taliban targets in the northwest portion of Pakistan.9 
The disagreements manifest themselves in varying conclusions on the 
legality of a given UAS strike in Pakistan.  Yet, that overt disagreement on 
the answer to the legality question masks that the various participants in the 
discussion are utilizing wholesale different methodologies and talking past 
each other in the process.  Some speak in terms of how the United Nations 
Charter governs the overarching question of legality; others claim that the 
Charter provides only some of the framework; and still others posit that the 
Charter does not meaningfully apply at all.10  This divergence leads to 
correspondingly varied answers as to what extent the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC) or human rights law applies to the use of force through the United 
States engaging targets in Pakistan.  These answers range from the charac-
terization of the conflict in Pakistan as a war and UAS strikes as “just the 
killing of the enemy, wherever and however found” to the same strike being 
labeled extrajudicial killings, targeted assassination, and outright murder.11 
This article assesses the legality of armed UAS strikes in Pakistan 
through two normative constructs.  The first is jus ad bellum, the law gov-
erning resorting to force.  The second is jus en bello, the law governing the 
actual conduct of hostilities.12  Together, the two constructs comprise what 
 
8. P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, THE NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 2009, at 
41 (quoting Marc Garlasco of Human Rights Watch). 
9. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedermann, Revenge of the Drones An Analysis of the Drones 
Strikes in Pakistan, NEW AM. FOUND., Oct. 19, 2009, at 1 (claiming “that [a]n important factor in 
the controversy over [drone attacks] is the widespread perception that they kill large number of 
Pakistani civilians”).  Yet the attacks are perceived as effective, a point demonstrated by a recent 
al Qaeda attack.  The site al Qaeda selected for a January 2010 suicide bombing was a United 
States Central Intelligence Agency base near Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, a base which 
purportedly oversaw UAS attacks.  Joby Warrick & Pamela Constable, Attacked CIA Facility 
Supported Drone Strikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2010, at A1.  The attack killed seven CIA officers 
in the deadliest single attack against the CIA since the 1983 combing of the United States 
Embassy in Beirut. Id. 
10. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan, 
2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL:  THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144.  See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense 
Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. 
TRANS.  L. & POL. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=1520717##. 
11. James Kitfield, Wanted:  Dead, NAT’L J., Jan. 9, 2010, at 21 (quoting the former CIA 
counter-terrorism chief for the wartime characterization). 
12. See Eyal Benvenisti, Rethinking the Divide Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in 
Warfare Against Nonstate Actors, YALE J. OF INT’L L. 541, 541-42 (2009).  While acknowledging 
that the two norms are logically independent, Benvenisti raises some interesting questions as to 
the logic of that dichotomy given the influence of jus ad bellum considerations in jus in bello 
analysis, particularly as applied to nonstate actors.  See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation:  
Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 
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is referred to as the LOAC.13  Unlike broader or more general legal con-
structs, the LOAC governs a specific subject matter, the use and application 
of force during armed conflict.  This article considers both the question of 
the lawfulness of UAS strikes and the manner in which they occur through 
a LOAC prism. 
This article also seeks to add clarity to the conversation by outlining 
the different levels of analysis utilized to assess UAS strikes as a use of 
force and how those levels lead to disagreement and misunderstanding well 
beyond differing conclusions on legality.  The article begins by defining a 
UAS and discussing its prevalence around the world.  Utilizing a recent 
UAS strike in Pakistan, the article then reviews the international law 
framework applicable to the use of armed UAS.  The article then considers 
the associated LOAC targeting principles applicable to such a strike, 
exploring how in some ways UAS strikes are preferable compared to 
traditional aerial bombing, but in others less so.  The article determines that 
while how one characterizes the conflict in Pakistan, internally and via the 
United States, and whether Pakistan has consented to the strikes, trigger 
different analytical frameworks; however, the conclusion is the same—that 
the UAS strikes are lawful.  Yet ultimately, the current level of discourse 
demonstrates that constructive debate is needed, not just on UAS strike 
legality, but on the appropriate legal framework through which such 
conclusions are reached. 
II. BACKGROUND OF UAS 
A. WHAT IS AN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM? 
For the purposes of this article, the terms UAS, unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV), and drone are synonymous.  The term UAS reflects the 
United States Army’s current terminology.14  The Department of Defense 
 
YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 50 (2009) (labeling the requirement that jus ad bellum and jus in bello be 
considered separately a dualistic axiom, which Sloane asserts is logically questionable). 
13. See DAVID P. CAVALERI, THE LAW OF WAR:  CAN 20TH-CENTURY STANDARDS APPLY 
TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM? 9 (Combat Studies Institute Press), available at 
http://www.au.af mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/csi_cavaleri_law.pdf (tracing the development of just 
war theory including how, in the 17th century, Hugo Grotius, one of the founders of modern 
international law, expanded the list of principles of just war—jus ad bellum—to include fighting 
the war in a just manner, beginning the concept of jus in bello in the process).  The Department of 
Defense defines the LOAC as “[t]hat part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed 
hostilities.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, ¶ 3.1 (2006) [hereinafter DIRECTIVE 
2311.01E]. 
14. Christopher B. Carlile, Leading the Army’s UAS Synchronization Efforts, ARMY MAG., 
Jan. 2010, at 35 (describing the development of the United States Army’s Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, Alabama). 
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still uses the term UAV, which it defines as “[a] powered, aerial vehicle 
that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide 
vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable 
or recoverable, and [ ] carr[ies] a lethal or nonlethal payload.  Ballistic or 
semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not 
considered unmanned aerial vehicles.”15  Within the current United States 
inventory, UAS range in size from the Wasp and the Raven, at 38 inches 
long, both of which are “launched” by being thrown in the air by hand, to 
the twenty-seven foot long Predator and the forty-foot long Global Hawk.16  
The UAS capable of carrying weapons generally carry “Hellfire” missiles.17 
This section should perhaps be titled “What is an UAS Now,” given 
how different future systems may be from those at issue today.  In his book, 
Wired For War:  The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First 
Century, P.W. Singer details the UAS likely to be utilized in future 
conflicts.18  These include a UAS which could remain airborne for up to 
five years; a high altitude airship “parked” as high as one hundred thousand 
feet up; micro-UAS the size of insects, and “robo-lobsters” and other 
drones intended for use at sea.19  This evolution will render the associated 
legal analysis that much more difficult, reinforcing the imperative to reach 
consensus on the framework of that analysis.  Before discussing that 
framework, the proliferation of UAS bears mention. 
 
15. JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS 577 (2001).  The distinction between autonomously and remotely piloted 
UAVs is that “[a]n autonomously piloted UAV is one that is pre-programmed for its mission 
before it takes off.  It then flies its mission without a ground-based pilot.  A remotely piloted UAV 
is controlled by a pilot in a control station on the ground during the flight.”  GAO report, supra 
note 3, at 4 n.5. 
16. Singer, supra note 8, at 37-39. 
17. Hellfire is an air-to-ground missile system which uses laser guidance and a roughly 
twenty pound warhead to defeat tanks and other individual targets.  Hellfire History, Redstone 
Army Arsenal, http://www redstone.army mil/history/systems/HELLFIRE html (last visited Mar. 
9, 2010).  Each missile costs some $58,000.  The United States utilizes the Hellfire on a variety of 
weapons platforms.  Sweden, Israel, and Egypt also use the system.  Development of the Hellfire 
began over 40 years ago; so, not surprisingly, the United States military recently announced the 
Joint Air-to Ground Missile (JAGM) as the successor to the Hellfire missile as the armament for 
at least one model of UAVs, the Sky Warrior Extended Range Multi Purpose UAV.  Scott 
Gourley, Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), ARMY MAG., Dec. 2009, at 59.  The JAGM will 
be fielded in 2016 and offers increased range and accuracy over the Hellfire. Id.  The extent to 
which this increased capability will alter what is feasible as well as required under IHL is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
18. Singer, supra note 8, at 25. 
19. Id. at 39-40. 
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B. WHO HAVE UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS? 
Much of the UAS attention centers on the United States, and perhaps 
Israel, as the only countries that employ armed UAS.  Yet at least forty-four 
countries have UAS.20  While those countries currently employ UAS as 
surveillance platforms, most have the capability for armed UAS.  The fact 
that countries around the world possess UAS is not new; yet the 
manifestations of that proliferation still seem surprising—that Iran utilizes 
UAS, which became obvious in the spring of 2009 when United States 
forces shot down an Iranian UAS in Iraq,21 or that Hezbollah’s UAS 
capability dates back to at least 2004.22  Unmanned aircraft systems are 
very much a global business; a British company manufacturers engines for 
Israeli UAS,23 while Israel in turn sells UAS to Russia.24 
Another example of where UAS proliferation can be found is Canada.  
Canada is participating in combat operations in Afghanistan as part of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization force.  In support of those operations, 
Canada is leasing Israeli-made “Heron” model UAS.25  Although the Heron 
is capable of carrying weapons, Canada elected not to arm them.  Yet 
Canada recently announced its intention to expend $500 million to acquire 
and employ armed UAS, to which the head of the Canadian Air Force 
added: 
What we have to be very mindful of is that Canada very much 
respects the law of armed conflict and you have to satisfy a 
number of conditions before you drop a weapon on anything . . . .  
 
20. See Scott Shane, Effective Yet Controversial, Drones are Here to Stay, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Dec. 3, 2009, at 6 (quoting P.W. Singer).  The wide range of other countries with UAS 
include Belarus, China, India, Pakistan and Russian to name just a few. Singer, Defending Against 
Drones, supra note 3.  Singer claims that “two thirds of worldwide investment in unmanned 
planes in 2010 will be spent by countries other than the United States.” Id.  Further demonstrating 
the ubiquitous nature of UAS, Singer documents how an editor for Wired magazine built a hand-
tossed UAS for $1000 and “an Arizona-based anti-immigrant group instituted its own pilotless 
surveillance system to monitor the United States Mexico border for just $25,000.” Id. 
21. Waleed Ibrahim & Missy Ryan, US Forces Shot Down Iranian Drone Over Iraq, 
REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2009, available at http://www reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52F2ZL20090316. 
22. Barbara Opall-Rome, “Mosquito Through a Net,” UAV Finds Flaw in Israeli Air 
Defenses, DEFENSE NEWS, Apr. 18, 2005, at 1.  While the Hezbollah UAS were primitive, that 
proved to be an advantage of sorts.  The drones were so slow that Israeli jets stalled trying to slow 
down enough to be able to shoot them down. Singer, Defending Against Drones, supra note 3. 
23. David Pallister, British Link With Drone Aiding the Israeli War Effort, THE GUARDIAN, 
Jan. 9, 2009, at 20. 
24. Israel Sells UAVs to Russia, On Condition, UNITED PRESS INT’L, June 26, 2009, 
available at http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/06/26/Israel-sells-UAVs 
-to-Russia-on-condition/UPI-85331246030604/. 
25. See Canada to Acquire Attack Drones:  Air Chief, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Mar. 6, 2009, 
available at http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/03/06/cdn-drones.html (describing the Heron 
lease as two years long and costing $94 million). 
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And in the case of the UAV, those conditions will be very difficult 
to satisfy, but it will also be a very useful option to have.26 
Canada’s willingness to expend half a billion dollars on a combat system, 
the legal use of which it seems to question, is emblematic of the important 
role UAS play, and will continue to play, on the battlefield.  It also speaks 
to the confused state of the legal analysis surrounding UAS, confusion that 
is unnecessarily increased when considering who controls the UAS. 
C. SETTING THE STAGE 
The current controversy surrounding UAS strikes focuses on the 
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of northwest Pakistan, which 
runs along the eastern border of Afghanistan.  In the FATA, Pakistan is 
engaged in a conflict with a combination of tribal groups, al Qaeda, and 
both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.27  These groups are, in one sense, 
disparate entities with differing objectives, but for the purposes of this 
article will be collectively referred to as insurgents or organized armed 
groups.  The conflict within the FATA dates back to at least 2004 and has 
involved over a 100,000 Pakistani troops and members of Pakistan’s 
frontier corps on one side and up to an estimated 20,000+ insurgents on the 
other.  The insurgents have controlled territory within the FATA and killed 
over 2,200 members of the Pakistani military.28  While the intensity of the 
conflict has varied, the engagements between Pakistani forces and these 
organized armed groups operating within Pakistan have been characterized 
as offensives, battles, and indeed even outright war. 
The insurgents pose a threat to Pakistan and, owing to their cross 
border operations, also to both United States and Afghan forces in adjacent 
Afghanistan.  As President Obama stated, “[t]here is no doubt that the 
United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.”29  Consider the former 
leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in an 
August 2009 UAS strike in Pakistan.  At that time, the Pakistani Taliban 
had some 16,000 fighters, and while most of them were Pakistani, some 
4,000 were Arabs and Central Asians.30  Mehsud was the purported 
architect of the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir 
Bhutto and the bombing of a hotel in Islamabad, which killed more than 50 
 
26. Id. (quoting Canadian Lieutenant General Angus Watt). 
27. See Sean Murphy, The International Legality of U.S. Military Cross-Border Operations 
From Afghanistan Into Pakistan, 84 INT’L L. STUDIES 111, 113 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009). 
28. See Pamela Constable and Haw Nawaz Khan, U.S. Drone Attack May Have Killed 
Leader of Pakistani Taliban, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2010, at A16. 
29. Shane Harris, Are Drone Strikes Murder?, NAT’L J., Jan. 9, 2010, at 14. 
30. Id. at 14. 
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people,31 which led to him being described as Pakistan’s top public 
enemy.32  But Mehsud is also believed to have orchestrated numerous sui-
cide bombings against the United States in Afghanistan,33 against whom he 
declared a jihad.34  Mehsud’s actions, and those of other similarly situated 
(and acting) insurgents in the FATA, provide the backdrop for considering 
the legality of the United States response—armed UAS strikes. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED UAS 
IN PAKISTAN 
A. JUS AD BELLUM 
Assessing the lawfulness of the UAS strikes first requires 
characterizing the nature of the conflict.  While such a characterization 
sounds easy enough, as applied to the FATA, it is anything but.  There 
would appear to be at least three characterizations of the conflict:  (1) a 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between the United States and 
Afghanistan on one side and organized armed groups operating from the 
FATA35 on the other, leading to an inherently confusing term, “inter-
nationalized” NIAC; (2) a NIAC between Pakistan on one side and the 
same organized armed groups operating from the FATA on the other; (3) 
international armed conflict (IAC) between Afghanistan and the United 
States on one side and if not Pakistan directly, Pakistan’s agents or proxies 
on the other. 
While noting Pakistan’s intelligence service support of the Taliban, at 
least prior to September 11th,36 this article does not further consider the 
concept of an IAC between the United States and Pakistan because recent 
Pakistani attacks on the Taliban undermine any agency or proxy argument.  
Instead, this article considers the lawfulness of UAS strikes within the two 
variants of NIAC.  While the variants and the analysis that flows are not 
mutually exclusive by any means, they are treated as such to provide a 
clearer analytical framework.  The reality seems to be a hybrid of the two 
 
31. See Constable & Khan, supra note 28 (describing how a UAS attack may also have 
killed Mehsud’s successor as the leader of the Pakistani Taliban). 
32. Haq Nawaz Khan & Pamela Constable, Pakistani Taliban in Dire Position, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 2, 2010, at A1. 
33. Bergen & Tiedermann, supra note 9. 
34. Harris, supra note 29, at 26. 
35. The absence of a state on both sides of the conflict would preclude the characterization of 
the situation as an international armed conflict. 
36. See Jayshree Bajoria, The ISI and Terrorism:  Behind the Accusations, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., May 28, 2009, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/ (describing 
support by Pakistani’s military intelligence of the Afghan Taliban). 
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NIAC variants, meaning that Pakistan is engaging in an internal fight, and 
aspects of that fight cross the border with Afghanistan, and impact the 
United States and its Afghan and NATO allies.  Perhaps more accurately 
that is the “U.S. reality” as the Europeans purportedly recognize 
Afghanistan, but not Pakistan, as a designated combat zone.37 
1. “Internationalized NIAC” 
Under this characterization, United States forces in Afghanistan are 
engaged in a conflict with insurgents operating in and from the FATA.  
Additionally, Pakistan is either unwilling or unable to control the insurgents 
or at least prevent their use of force outside the borders of Pakistan.  To 
further distinguish this NIAC characterization, assume that Pakistan does 
not consent to the UAS strikes within its borders.  Finally, this article 
assumes the purpose of UAS strikes is a preemptive or preventive action 
against prospective hostile acts the target is likely to commit in the future.38 
The starting point for the analysis under these circumstances is the 
United Nations Charter.39  In Article 2(4), the Charter states that “[a]ll 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”40  But this prohibition on the use of force is balanced against, and 
even subordinate to, Article 51, which provides in pertinent part that 
“[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations . . . .”41 
That the Charter acknowledges not just a right to self defense but that 
such a right is an inherent one is notable.  The acknowledgment reflects and 
 
37. Harris, supra note 29, at 6 (quoting two former British security officials as stating that 
the UAS strikes “epitomize the difference between the American and European approaches” to 
counterterrorism). 
38. The alternative to the assumption that UAS strikes are preemptive is that the strikes 
might be reactive, punitive, and action-based on the target’s prior acts.  Such targeting would 
constitute a reprisal, a controversial issue in and of itself, and beyond the scope of this article.  
Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365, 382-86 (2009) (explaining 
and distinguishing reprisal from the concept of reciprocity). 
39. But see O’Connell, supra note 10, at 16. 
40. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
41. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).  Article 51 continues: 
[m]easures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take 
at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
Id. 
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codifies that for centuries before the Charter, states used force to defend 
their natural interests in ways the international community considered 
legitimate.  Thus, the use of force in self-defense both precedes and sur-
vives the Charter.  As such, the use of force in self-defense is subsumed by 
Article 51 and may be considered lawful.  Specifically, pre-Charter use of 
force varied in both manner and level of acceptance.  Even among advo-
cates of the general proposition, the kinds of force that precede and survive 
the Charter is debated.42  One such use of force potentially relevant to this 
discussion is the principal of “self-help” whereby a state uses force in 
defense of its nationals.43 
In a December 2009 presentation to the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, Georgetown Professor David Luban explained his view that the 
inherent right of self-defense is a preemptive one, extending at least as far 
as the parameters of the Caroline test.44  Here Luban refers to a 19th 
century attack by the United Kingdom of a United States steamship, the 
Caroline.  The British claimed self-defense as the basis of their attack of the 
Caroline, which was intermittently used in support of Canadian insurrection 
against Britain.  Daniel Webster, then United States Secretary of State, 
articulated what became the Caroline test in 1841.45  Webster stated that the 
“necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”46  Luban labels the use 
of force under such circumstances preemptive, and argues that the condi-
tions of imminence and necessity have led to wide acceptance.47  He con-
trasts this with preventive use of force, where an attack is anticipated but 
not imminent.  Luban contends the consensus view is that Article 51 does 
not include a preventive use of force.48 
 
42. See Robert Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use of Force in 
Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern World, in LEGAL AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS 
ON LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, 67 U.S. NAVAL WAR C. INT’L L. STUDIES 43, 62-64 (Albert R 
Coll et al. eds.) (1992).  Turner outlines the history, and scope, of the right of self-defense.  He 
contends that “the nature of the wrongful act” dictates the classification of the response and lists 
retorsion, reprisal, self-help and self-defense as examples. 
43. The concept of self-help might apply to the United States’ use of force in the FATA to 
protect Americans in Afghanistan.  The self-help aspect would derive from Pakistan’s 
unwillingness or inability to prevent the attacks from the FATA into Afghanistan. 
44. David Luban, Preventative War and the U.N. Charter, Presentation to the American 
Society of International Law, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 3, 2009) (on file with author). 
45. The Caroline, 2 J. MOORE, DIG. OF INT’L L. 409, 412 (1906) (describing the exchange of 
diplomatic notes between Great Britain and the United States in 1842). 
46. Id. 
47. See Sean Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV., 699, 699-
719 (2005) (describing the doctrine’s evolution and four schools of thought on its parameters: the 
strict constructionist school, the imminent threat school, the qualitative threat school, and the 
“[U.N.] charter is dead” school). 
48. Luban, supra note 44. 
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Yet Luban acknowledges how the founders of natural law struggled 
with the boundaries of self-defense.  Alberico Gentile, one of the first pro-
fessors of international law, stated that “[w]e ought not wait for violence to 
be offered us, it is safer to meet it halfway.  No one ought to expose himself 
to danger.  No one ought to wait to be struck, unless he is a fool.”49  
Reduced to a maxim, under Gentile, “[a] defense is just which anticipates 
dangers that are . . . probably and possible.”50  To this, Swiss philosopher 
Emer Vattel added the concept of proportionality,51 that the justification for 
“forestalling a danger in direct ratio to the degree of the probability attend-
ing to it, and to the seriousness of the evil with which it is threatened.”52 
There is an interesting parallel between the 250 year-old musings of 
European philosophers and the United States’ post 9/11 National Security 
Strategy.  Under that strategy, “[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the risk 
of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory 
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and 
place of the enemy’s attack.”53  Also, the strategy provides an open 
acknowledgement that the United States must act “against such emerging 
threats before they are fully formed.”54 
Applied to the FATA, the circumstances seem to meet a preventive but 
not preemptive threshold.  While the circumstances leading up to a UAS 
strike are largely unknown (or not released), it seems reasonable to assume 
that few of the targets in Pakistan were in the process of an “imminent” 
attack.  Consider the 2009 strike that killed Baitullah Mehsud.  At the 
moment the missile struck Mehsud’s hideout, one account states Mehsud 
was on the roof receiving a massage,55 while another account states he was 
 
49. Id. 
50. Id.  Gentile’s successor at Oxford, Hugo Grotius, “accepted something like the Caroline 
test: preempting an attack if justified, but only if the attack is immediate and imminent in point of 
time.” Id.  Luban contrasts Grotius’ view with that of German natural law philosopher Samuel von 
Pufendorf, who found Grotius’ view of only slightly useful.  According to Luban, “[f]or 
Pufendorf, fear alone can be a just cause but only if ‘we determine with a morally evident 
certitude that there is an intention to hurt us.’” Id. 
51. In this context, proportionate response should not be confused with the jus en bello 
principle of proportionality. 
52. See Luban supra note 44, at 2 (quoting Vattel). 
53. NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 15 (Sept. 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/ 
2002/; see DEP’T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf. 
54. George W. Bush, Foreword to NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 2002), available at htto://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002. 
55. Bergen & Tiedermann, supra note 9. 
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on the roof receiving medical care.56  So while it may be reasonable, even 
prudent, to anticipate that Mehsud would organize further attacks, it is 
unlikely that he was doing so while on the roof that day.  Accordingly, the 
jus ad bellum analysis depends on how one defines the parameters of self-
defense under Article 51.  If self defense extends to a preventive use of 
force, then where there is reliable intelligence of such a threat, the subse-
quent use of force against that threat in the form of a UAS strike is 
permissible, even without Pakistan’s consent. 
This analysis was predicated on the use of force in the territory of a 
sovereign state without that state’s consent.  Doing so invokes the U.N. 
Charter when in reality it may not apply.  That’s because 
[t]he Charter does not directly regulate the resort to force within 
states between government forces and non-state actors or between 
non-state actor groups.  This is an unfortunate gap in the law as the 
most common form of armed conflict today is the internal armed 
conflict, armed conflicts mostly within the boundaries of a single 
state fought by groups contending for power or to secede.57 
Turning to that characterization of conflict—a non-international armed 
conflict—yields a different analysis but similar overall outcome. 
2. Non-International Armed Conflict 
The alternative characterization of the conflict is that of a NIAC 
between Pakistan on one side and organized armed groups operating from 
the FATA on the other.  An assumption implicit in this characterization is 
that Pakistan consents to the UAS strikes and that the United States is either 
assisting with Pakistan’s foreign internal defense or essentially acting as 
Pakistan’s agent.  The validity of the consent assumption is debatable.58  
Pakistan has not publicly announced its view, rendering inquiry into the 
relationship difficult.59  The basis for the assumption is that Pakistan has 
 
56. O’Connell, supra note 10, at 11. 
57. Id. at 16. 
58. Sean Murphy, The International Legality of U.S. Military Cross-Border Operations 
From Afghanistan Into Pakistan, 85 INT’L L. STUD. 79, 118-20 (2009) (describing the role of 
Pakistan’s consent, or lack thereof, in the analysis into the legality of the UAS strikes). 
59. Shane, supra note 20, at 2.  Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur for extra-
judicial killings, stated that it is impossible to judge whether the UAV strikes violate international 
law without knowing whether Pakistan consented. Id.  That would seem to overstate the matter.  
As this article explains, there is an analytical framework where Pakistan consents, and another—
primarily the Article 51 analysis—if it does not. 
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knowledge of the strikes and the opportunity to formally and publicly 
object to the strikes, but has not done so.60 
For example, in early December 2009, the Prime Minister of Pakistan 
said that United States UAS strikes in Pakistan “do no good, because they 
boost anti-American resentment throughout the country.”61  Similarly, in 
January 2010, the Pakistani Foreign Minister said that expanding UAS 
strikes might “undermine” Pakistan’s relationship with the United States.62  
While not ringing endorsements of the strikes, the statements do not 
constitute an objection; in fact, the latter implies approval, but only to an 
undefined point.63  On the other hand, in February 2010, the Washington 
Post reported that 
[a]lthough the Pakistani government publicly complains about the 
drone attacks, it privately endorses the strategy under rules negoti-
ated in mid-2008.  This agreement permits the CIA to fire when it 
has solid intelligence and to provide “concurrent notification” to 
Pakistan, which typically means shortly after a Hellfire missile is 
launched.64 
As previously mentioned, Pakistani consent is assumed in order to 
distinguish the two forms of NIAC for the purposes of breaking out the 
analytical frameworks.  Without that assumption, the United States, through 
 
60. In the fall of 2008, the New York Times reported that an Obama administration official 
said that “no tacit agreement had been reached to allow increased [UAS] strikes [in Pakistan] in 
exchange for a backing off from additional American ground raids” referring to a September 3, 
2009, raid by United States Special Operations personnel into Pakistan.  Mark Mazzetti & Eric 
Schmitt, U.S. Takes to Air to Hit Militants Inside Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, available 
at http://www nytimes.com/2008/10/27/washington/27intel html.  According to the story, 
“Pakistani officials have made clear in public statements that they regard the [UAS] attacks as a 
less objectionable violation of Pakistani sovereignty.” Id.  More recent media reports claim that 
many of the American UAS strikes originate from a base in Pakistan and that their increased 
frequency is the result of a March 2009 deal between the United States and Pakistan, which 
provides Pakistanis greater control of the targets. Kitfield, supra note 11, at 6.  According to 
Kitfield, “[f]or domestic political consumption, Pakistan’s leaders promote the image of CIA 
agents flying drones from its American headquarters, but the program clearly involves a high 
degree of involvement by Americans inside Pakistan, and by the Pakistani government.” Id. 
61. Shane, supra note 20, at 2. 
62. Joby Warrick & Pamela Constable, Attacked CIA Facility Supported Drone Strikes, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2010, at A1. 
63. See Interview with Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Foreign Minister of Pakistan with Zeinab 
Badawi, Reporter, BBC NEWS, Pakistan FM:  US Drones a Threat to Sovereignty (Dec. 1, 2009) 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/8388331.stm (claiming that the 
Pakistani Foreign Minister referred to American UAV attacks as a threat to Pakistan’s 
sovereignty).  The solution according to the Foreign Minister was for the United States to transfer 
its UAV technology to Pakistan, which presumably would continue the strikes. Id. 
64. David Ignatius, What The Partisan Squabbles Miss On Obama’s Terror Response, 
WASH. POST. Feb. 17, 2010, at A13; see also Mark Mazzetti and Jane Perlez, CIA and Pakistan 
Work Together, But Do So Warily, NY TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at A1 (describing how the CIA and 
Pakistan “are working together on tactical operations,” both drone strikes and ground raids). 
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UAS strikes in the FATA, would be violating Pakistan’s territorial sover-
eignty.  As discussed in the prior example, the lawfulness inquiry would 
begin by applying Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which requires that 
member states refrain from the use or force or the threat thereof, as well as 
the Article 51 self-defense provisions.  But here, the assumption is that 
United States action is at the behest of the Pakistan government.  As such 
there is not a jus ad bellum inquiry per se as the use of force by the United 
States is not against the territorial integrity of Pakistan, but against their 
shared enemy, organized armed groups operating in the FATA and eastern 
Afghanistan. 
While the characterization of the conflict in Pakistan—either in regards 
to Pakistan or the United States, as well as whether Pakistan has consented 
to UAS strikes—prompts different jus ad bellum analysis, the result is the 
same:  the UAS strikes are a lawful use of force.  Such a result depends on 
the position that preventive use of force may qualify as self-defense under 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or in the alternative, that Pakistan has con-
sented to the UAS strikes.  But again, those conclusions address the 
question of whether resorting to force is lawful.  The actual conduct of a 
UAS strike invokes a different construct and analysis. 
B. JUS IN BELLO 
Having considered jus ad bellum, the lawfulness of resorting to UAS 
strikes, the inquiry shifts to jus en bello, the law governing the conduct of 
the strikes themselves.  As previously discussed, this analysis, like that 
under jus ad bellum, occurs through the prism of the LOAC.  The impact of 
that point is more pronounced in the jus in bello analysis. The LOAC is the 
more specific law (lex specialis) for regulating the conduct of hostilities.  
Other, more general law (lex generalis), such as human rights law, may still 
apply but its application, and interpretation, is through the LOAC.  In 
explaining the relationship between human rights law and the LOAC, the 
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion on the threat or use 
of nuclear opinions remains instructive.  While considering the most 
sacrosanct of human rights, the right to life, the ICJ stated that 
[t]he protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of 
Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be dero-
gated from in a time of national emergency.  Respect for the right 
to life is not, however, such a provision.  In principle, the right not 
arbitrarily to be deprived of [one’s] life applies also in hostilities.  
The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then 
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falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the 
law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities.  Thus whether a particular loss of life, 
through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered 
an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Cove-
nant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in 
armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant 
itself.65 
Accordingly, characterizations of UAS strikes using human rights 
terms like assassination or extrajudicial killing are incorrect as they rely on 
the lex generalis, human rights law, as opposed to the lex specialis, the 
LOAC.66  That the LOAC is the applicable law in the FATA is borne out by 
another international tribunal.  In fact, the International Criminal Tribunal 
of Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) Tadic decision is instructive on two levels.67  First, 
Tadic helps discern when an internal conflict rises to the level of an armed 
conflict.  Secondly, Tadic instructs as to the scope of the LOAC which 
applies during such an armed conflict.  As to the first point, according to the 
ICTY, 
an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between states or protracted armed violence between govern-
mental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a state.  International humanitarian law [LOAC] 
applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends 
beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of 
peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful 
settlement is achieved.  Until that moment, international 
 
65. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 240 
(July 8). See also Bankovic and others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States, Case No. 
52207/99, 12 December 2001 (holding that NATO airstrikes in Kosovo did not constitute 
effective control sufficient to trigger application of the European Convention of Human Rights). 
66. See Harris, supra note 29 (describing how many experts “believe that some drone attacks 
could rightly be called ‘extrajudicial killing,’” a conclusion requiring analysis under human rights 
law, not the LOAC). Press Release, UN Expert Tells Third Committee No State Free from Human 
Rights Violations; Accountability System Must Be Effective in as Many States as Possible 
Committee Hears from Human Rights Council Experts on Education, Extrajudicial Execution, 
Foreign Debt, As Two-Week Debate Continues, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3960 (Oct. 27, 2009) 
(quoting Special Rapporteur Alston as stating that drone strikes “remained unchecked by rules 
governing international humanitarian law”).  Without listing any authority or basis, Alston goes 
on to claim that the CIA had “determine[d] in complete isolation who, when, and where they 
would kill and . . . insist[ed] that they were not subject to human rights or humanitarian law.” Id.  
Yet the application of human rights instruments, domestically or extraterritorially, requires a state 
to have effective control.  Pakistan does not have effective control over the FATA, so state human 
rights obligations are not triggered. 
67. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment (Feb. 20, 2001). 
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humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the 
warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole 
territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat 
takes place there.68 
In the case of the FATA, there is protracted armed violence between 
Pakistan and the insurgents, which are “organized armed groups.”  
Accordingly, the current environment is properly considered an armed 
conflict and not some lesser form of internal disturbance, for which a law 
enforcement framework might be more appropriate.69 
The import of the determination that an armed conflict exists70 is 
Tadic’s next contribution to the analysis.  Under Tadic, where an armed 
conflict exists, the full panoply of customary international law of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies to the jus in bello analysis.71  In 
other words, the much broader and more developed rules governing IAC 
apply to the NIAC in Pakistan.72  Notwithstanding it is the lex specialis, one 
area where IHL is more developed and appropriate than human rights law is 
 
68. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocatory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
69. See Int’l Inst. Of Humanitarian Law (ITHL), Manual on The Law of Non International 
Armed Conflict With Commentary, at 2-3, available at http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images/ 
Manual%5B1%5D.Final.Brill..pdf.  Indicia of this lesser form of disturbance include riots and 
sporadic or isolated acts of violence. Id. at 2. 
70. One problem with this determination is that Pakistan has not acknowledged the existence 
of a NIAC within its borders.  In some ways this is not surprising.  Despite more than a hundred 
instances around the world over the last sixty years which may have constituted an armed conflict, 
only two states have explicitly made that acknowledgment:  El Salvador regarding its conflict in 
the 1980s against the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and 
Columbia’s long standing struggle with the Fuerzas Armados Revolucionaires de Columbia—
Ejército del Pueblo (FARC).  Reasons why states do not acknowledge a NIAC include the 
resulting implication that a state has lost control and increased chance that other states will 
involve themselves.  One offshoot of not acknowledging a NIAC is that the states subsequent use 
of force is evaluated under a law enforcement, or human rights paradigm.  Returning to UAS 
strikes in Pakistan, one could argue that there is in essence a conflict of laws between how the 
United States and Pakistan view the same conflict inside Pakistan.  The disconcerting result is that 
were Pakistan to employ UAS in the FATA, that use of force would be judged differently than a 
similar UAS strike. 
71. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 89 (Oct. 2, 1995) (describing the international 
humanitarian law applicable during an armed conflict as the Hague and Geneva Conventions as 
well as “customary rules on internal conflict” and even agreements binding between the parties to 
the conflict which are not customary international law). 
72. The United States would not likely utilize the Tadic analysis.  Instead, the United States, 
as a matter of policy, complies “with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such 
conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations.” Directive 2311.01E, supra note 
13, at ¶ 4.1.  From the DoD perspective, the LOAC “encompasses all international law for the 
conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and 
international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary 
international law.” Id. at ¶ 3.1 (emphasis added). 
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in how targeting decisions are permissibly made and subsequently 
evaluated.73 
IV. TARGETING PRINCIPLES 
The laws governing targeting are primarily derived from two sources.  
The first is the Fourth 1907 Hague Convention, which regulates the “means 
and methods” of warfare.74  The other source is the first two Additional 
Protocols (AP) to the Geneva Conventions.75  According to one United 
States law of war expert, the protocols arguably merged the Hague means 
and methods tradition with the Geneva tradition of protecting victims of 
warfare.76  This section will focus on the application of the AP I concepts of 
distinction, proportionality, and precautions in the attack to UAS strikes. 
The section concludes with a discussion about reciprocal responsibility and, 
who, in the case of UAS strikes in the FATA, is doing the targeting. 
A. DISTINCTION 
The principle of distinction flows from the prohibition against 
“[i]ndiscriminate attacks” which, among other limitations, are “not directed 
at a specific military objective.”77  But do members of organized armed 
groups in Pakistan constitute such an objective?  The basic rule under 
Article 48 of AP I is that “[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of 
the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall 
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct 
their operations only against military objectives.”78 
 
73. See Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades:  The Logical Limit of Applying 
Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. (forthcoming 
2010). 
74. See Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 48 (Adam Roberts and 
Richard Guelff eds., Oxford University Press 1982). 
75. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (AP II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; 26 
I.L.M 568 (1987). 
76. Richard Jackson, Special Assistant on Law of War Matters Army Judge Advocate 
General Corps, Panelist at the Willamette University College of Law Panel:  Empirical 
Approaches to the International Law of War (Mar. 6, 2009) (on file with author).  While the 
United States has not acceded to either AP I or AP II, the United States recognizes aspects of each 
as customary international law. As Jackson notes, “more importantly, the United States complies 
with these provisions in the relevant practice.” Id. at 9. 
77. AP I, supra note 75, art. 51(4). 
78. AP I, supra note 75, art. 48. 
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As a result, “[t]he civilian population and individual civilians shall 
enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military opera-
tions.”79  But civilians enjoy that protection “unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities.”80  What constitutes direct participation 
in hostilities is widely debated and the subject of recent interpretative 
guidance by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).81  But 
the situation in the FATA avoids much of that disagreement, because 
members of an organized armed group do not qualify as civilians.82  Such 
insurgents, through repeated direct participation in hostilities, perform what 
amounts to a continuous combat function that does not warrant the status 
and subsequent protections afforded civilians.83  Killing such insurgents is a 
permissible military objective and, subject to the conduct of the attack, such 
an attack is not indiscriminate. 
Yet, the individuals who happen to be near the insurgents may be 
entitled to the protections.  While not the objective of the attack, such 
individuals may still be wounded or killed in an UAS strike on an insurgent.  
The principle of proportionality helps address whether their injury or death 
causes the attack to be considered indiscriminate. 
B. PROPORTIONALITY84 
The principle of proportionality “reflects this balance between 
humanitarian concerns and military necessity.”85  As one commentator 
acknowledged, “[a]t its core, however, the principle of proportionality still 
 
79. AP I, supra note 75, art. 51(1). 
80. AP I, supra note 75, art. 51(3). 
81. NILS MELZER, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE 
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW, 2009 [hereinafter DPH study].  While the DPH study involved input from several countries, 
the final document is solely an ICRC product, reflecting that “the participants failed to reach a 
consensus” in a process described as “highly contentious.” Harris, supra note 29, at 3. 
82. DPH study, supra note 81, at 16. 
83. DPH study, supra note 81, at 35.  One difficulty is in parsing such members from those 
performing a “spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary role assumed for the duration of a particular 
operation.” Id. 
84. See generally Kenneth Watkin, Assessing Proportionality:  Moral Complexity and Legal 
Rules, 8 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (2005). 
85. Jackson, supra note 76.  The concept of military necessity is first reflected in article 23 
of the Hague Convention. 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, supra note 74, at art. 23.  The fact that military aims play a role in the analysis is seen in 
the beginning of Hague IV, which was “inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far 
as military requirements permit.” Id. at prmbl. (emphasis added).  Jackson notes that this principle 
is often lost in the targeting discussion. Jackson, supra note 76.  While Jackson acknowledges this 
occurs due to the laudable concerns on the humanitarian impacts of warfare, doing so alters the 
essence of the law of war, which recognizes and attempts to balance both military necessity and 
humanitarian concerns. Id. 
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envisions that civilians may be harmed in the course of attacks against 
legitimate military objectives.”86  AP I lays out the proportionality principle 
by listing as indiscriminate “[a]n attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, 
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”87 
Some mistakenly read the proportionality rule as lending itself to an 
empirical analysis of comparing the numbers of civilians wounded to the 
numbers of enemy, in this case insurgents, wounded or killed.88  While that 
would make the application of the principle easier, the principle balances 
civilians wounded and killed and damage to their property against military 
advantage.  Military advantage is a subjective determination the military 
commander makes “based on his or her experience and evaluation of the 
target in the context of the entire campaign, and the information reasonably 
available at the relevant time.”89  As a general rule, proportionality does not 
limit the amount or type of force used; it considers the expected results.90 
The proportionality test is “much easier to formulate in principle than 
to apply to a complex or uncertain set of circumstances.  As a result, 
military commanders and states have enjoyed a great deal of discretion in 
making these evaluations.”91  To illustrate the application of proportion-
ality, consider the August 2009 UAS strike that targeted and killed 
Baitullah Mehsud.  The attack also reportedly killed one to three other 
 
86. Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 409, 427 (2009). 
87. AP I, supra note 75, art. 51(5)(b). 
88. See, e.g,. O’Connell, supra note 10, at 24.  O’Connell incorrectly claims that “[f]ifty 
civilians killed for one suspected combatant killed is a textbook example of a violation of the 
proportionality principle.” Id.  Since that is not even a correct recitation of the principle, it hardly 
stands as a textbook example of its application.  The balance is between the fifty civilians killed 
and the military advantage anticipated from the death of the suspected combatant.  Even if 
O’Connell’s claim of a 50 to 1 ratio is correct, and recent analysis suggests it’s not, the identity of 
that single combatant is key.  For example, the view of 50 to 1 where the 1 is Mehsud or Osama 
Bin Laden is different than where the 1 is a much lower level figure.  As to O’Connell’s 50 to 1 
claim, the New America Foundation reported in October 2009 that UAS strikes had killed 
between 750 and 1000 people in Pakistan and that 66 to 68 percent of them were militants and 
between 31 and 33 percent were civilians. Bergen & Tiedermann, supra note 9.  That analysis 
leads to a ratio of one civilian killed for every two militants. 
89. Jackson, supra note 76, at 10. 
90. But see HCJ 769/02 The Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel, at 29 [2005], 
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf (claiming that 
Israel’s interpretation of proportionality results in adding an additional requirement to Israeli 
forces that “a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is 
doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed”). It is important to remember the occupation 
setting, and attendant level of control, which underpins the case and decision. 
91. Beard, supra note 86, at 428. 
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members of al Qaeda, including Mehsud’s father in law, and two to four 
people who were reportedly civilians, including Mehsud’s wife.92 
Applying the principle of proportionality to the Mehsud strike results 
in balancing the deaths of the two to four civilians and damage to the 
building against the anticipated military advantage of killing the leader of 
the Pakistani Taliban.  But again, in addition to not being an empirical 
analysis, the assessment is also not made with the benefit of hindsight, but 
based on the information available to the commander at the time of the 
strike.93  Recognizing that even in the UAS era, intelligence is not perfect, 
the LOAC also mandates certain precautions before an attack. 
C. PRECAUTIONS IN THE ATTACK 
Article 57 of AP I outlines precautions to be taken before an attack.94  
These begin with the requirement that “[i]n the conduct of military opera-
tions, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians 
and civilian objects.”95  Of note, Article 57 continues with the requirement 
to “[d]o everything feasible” to verify that the target is a military objective 
and to “[t]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods 
of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”96  
The United States endeavors to meet the requirements of Article 57 through 
a variety of means.  These include extensive intelligence gathering, prepar-
ing collateral damage estimates and “no strike lists,” and often the use of a 
computer program to model the likely effects of a given weapon on a given 
target and the area nearby.97 
Here again, one finds very different applications of the same UAS 
qualities to the rule providing for precautions in the attack.  Specifically, 
 
92. Bergen & Tiedermann, supra note 9. 
93. See Beard, supra note 86, at 436-437 (describing the United States attack on the Al 
Firdos bunker during Operation Desert Storm).  Prior to the attack, the United States possessed 
intelligence that the bunker was being used as a headquarters for the Baath Party Secret Police.  
While there were intelligence personnel in the bunker, Beard states that there were approximately 
300 civilians in the bunker who were killed in the attack, including over 100 children.  The 
analysis of the Al Firdus bunker attack is not retrospective based on the tragic reality of the 
civilians housed in the bunker but is based on the information the commander had before the 
attack. Id. at 437.  Beard notes that the United States claimed its intelligence assets at the time 
were not able to detect that civilians were entering the bunker at night and questions how the 
analysis might vary today. Id.  Beard posits that “what was previously not legally feasible is being 
radically altered by what is now operationally required.” Id. at 435 (emphasis in original). 
94. AP I, supra note 75, at art. 57. 
95. AP I, supra note 75, art. 57(1). 
96. AP I, supra note 75, at art. 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii). 
97. Jackson, supra note 76, at 11-12. 
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UAS have the ability to loiter in the vicinity of a target area for hours, 
beaming back high quality images in the process.  One commentator labels 
this attribute as terrifying to people, because UAS “fly for hours overhead, 
hovering, filming, threatening to strike at any time.”98  Yet another con-
siders that same “persistent surveillance” as “vastly expand[ing] the infor-
mation resources available to military commanders” and in the process 
redefining feasible precautions.99  If, and how much, increases in UAS 
technology and prevalence shift the feasibility bar bears watching.  In 
directing UAS strikes in the FATA, the United States is obligated to com-
ply with the distinction and proportionality principles and precautions in the 
attack.  But both the United States and the insurgents, like Mehsud, have an 
obligation to limit casualties. 
D. RECIPROCAL RESPONSIBILITY100 
Article 58 of AP I states that parties to the conflict shall, “to the 
maximum extent feasible . . . endeavor to remove the civilian population, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity 
of military objectives.”101  Similarly, the parties shall “[a]void locating 
military objectives within or near densely populated areas.”102  Yet 
individuals like Mehsud deliberately place themselves in and amongst the 
civilian population, with the result being either the United States reluctant 
to attack or more civilian casualties if it does; however, the United States 
will bear the blame, if not legally, then in the public relations context.  The 
Pakistan Taliban’s use of this tactic does not remove the United States from 
its obligations discussed above.  But it should factor into the analysis of 
UAS targeting decisions and the inevitable post-strike discussion on the 
strike’s legality.  The Pakistan Taliban’s failure to meet their reciprocal 
responsibilities under the LOAC may also factor into the proportionality 
analysis.  To the extent that the “civilians” that the Pakistan Taliban live 
and operate among are considered voluntary human shields, then they are 
considered to be directly participating in hostilities.103  As a result, they 
could be permissibly targeted outright.  Their death or injury, or damage to 
their property, as the result of a UAS strike against the Pakistani Taliban 
would not be considered collateral damage. 
 
98. O’Connell, supra note 10, at 10. 
99. Beard, supra note 86, at 434-35. 
100. See generally Watts, supra note 38. 
101. AP I, supra note 75, art. 58(a). 
102. AP I, supra note 75, art. 58(b). 
103. DPH study, supra note 81, at 13 n.6. 
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E. WHO CONTROLS THE UAS? 
Much attention has been given to the question of who is controlling the 
UAS being used in the strikes in the FATA.  Is it the United States military?  
The CIA?  Contractors working for either?  The significance of the answer 
has been overblown.  To the extent it is the United States military, they are 
required to follow the LOAC.  Many believe that the CIA is the lead agency 
for the strikes in the FATA.104  Yet former CIA officials have stated that the 
agency follows a LOAC-based targeting methodology.105  It would seem to 
follow that to the extent contractors are involved at the behest of either the 
DoD or CIA, they follow the process and procedures of those agencies, 
including applying the LOAC.  The only significance to a CIA operative or 
contract employee controlling the UAS is that they become targetable under 
the law of war and also lack the combatant immunity that law affords the 
members of the military who comply with the LOAC.  That is not to say 
that their direct participation in the hostilities, by way of controlling a UAS 
strike, is prohibited or a war crime.  Instead, it means that they lack 
immunity from the opposing state’s national law.106  But the reality in the 
FATA is that the insurgents do not constitute an opposing state and the 
strikes are apparently being conducted at the behest of Pakistan; thus, the 
strikes constitute no more of a violation of Pakistani law than do the actions 
of the Pakistani military and police who apply deadly force in the same 
conflict. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Analyzing UAS strikes in Pakistan under both jus ad bellum and jus en 
bello provides a useful vehicle by which to consider not only the ultimate 
question of legality, but the framework used to do so.  Implicit in the 
analysis are questions that require a determination of the parameters of self 
defense under the U.N. Charter, and even whether the Charter applies.  
 
104. Mayer, supra note 4, at 2; Harris, supra note 29, at 1; Kitfield, supra note 11, at 8. 
105. Harris, supra note 29, at 5-6. 
106. DPH study, supra note 81, at 83-84 (“The absence in [the LOAC] of an express right 
for civilians to directly participate in hostilities does not necessarily imply an international 
prohibition of such participation.  Indeed, as such, civilian direct participation in hostilities is 
neither prohibited by IHL nor criminalized under the statutes of any prior or current international 
criminal tribunal or court.  However, because civilians . . . are not entitled to the combatant 
privilege, they do not enjoy immunity from domestic prosecution for lawful acts of war, that is, 
for having directly participated in hostilities while respecting IHL.  Consequently, civilians who 
have directly participated in hostilities and members of organized armed groups belonging to a 
non-State party to a conflict may be prosecuted and punished to the extent that their activities, 
their membership, or the harm caused by them is penalized under national law (as treason, arson, 
murder, etc.).”). 
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Similarly, how the conflict in the FATA is characterized, either internally 
or externally, shapes the analysis, as does whether Pakistan consents to the 
strikes. 
This article argued that in the jus ad bellum context, UAS strikes are 
permissible as preventive use of force in self defense if Pakistan does not 
consent to the strikes.  In the more likely event that Pakistan consents to the 
strikes, then they are at the implicit behest of Pakistan as part of a conflict 
against a mutual enemy.  The LOAC informs the analysis at all stages, 
particularly in terms of the conduct of the strikes themselves, jus en bello.  
UAS raise situational awareness on the battlefield to unprecedented levels, 
but this should not be mistaken for omniscience. 
It is a certainty that UAS capabilities will continue to advance, posing 
new challenges for the law in the process.  What is uncertain is whether 
baseline agreement can be reached as to even the applicable legal 
framework in order to move from cognitive dissonance to constructive 
dialogue. 
